HERODOTOS AND EUBOIA

M. B. WALLACE

SOME THINGS THAT HERODOTOS SAYS ABOUT EUBOIA seem unclear, and one main story appears not to be true. Discussing the difficulties may throw light both on the things said and on the way in which Herodotos says them.[1]

1. *Bribery at Artemision*

Herodotos says that Greek ships went to Artemision, withdrew when the Persians came near, returned after the storm, were dismayed by the strength that the Persians had left, and planned flight back "within Greece."[2] Then,

> The Euboians ... asked Eurybiades to stay a little time more till they might remove their children and their households. When they did not persuade (him), going instead to the Athenian commander, Themistokles, they persuade him for pay of thirty talents, on the basis that the Greeks shall stay and make their naval stand in front of Euboia ... to Eurybiades of this money he gives over five talents, as if giving it from himself indeed ... Adeimantos ... of the others alone protested ... Themistokles said ... "I shall give (you) greater gifts than the King of the Medes would ... and sends to Adeimantos' ship three talents of silver. Now (1) these men, subdued by gifts, were persuaded, and the Euboians were done favour, (2) Themistokles himself profited, but escaped notice keeping the rest—rather those that shared this money understood it to come from Athens on this account. Thus they stayed ... (8.4.2–6.1).

The story is, then, that the Greeks stayed and fought the battle of Artemision only because three of their commanders were bribed to keep them there. This is usually thought not to be true.

Strategy is the first problem. One would expect the Greeks never to have gone to Artemision at all if they had thought naval defence of the much easier position at the Euripos compatible with land defence of Thermopylai. Thus leaving Artemision involved abandoning the Thermo-

[1]Mary White has overseen most of my work in Greek history and my debt to her here as elsewhere is extensive. I have also made particular use of the Euboian studies of my late father, W. P. Wallace. P. S. Derow has kindly criticized various drafts.

The following special abbreviations are employed: Plutarch *dMH* = Plutarch *de Malignitate Herodoti*, Burn = A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London 1962), Meiggs and Lewis = R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1969), Pritchett = W. Kendrick Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices, Part* 1 (Berkeley, etc. 1971, University of California Publications in Classical Studies 7), Wade-Gery, *Essays* = H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958).

[2]Hdt. 7.175–183, esp. 177, 183.1; 7.192; 8.4.1. See below, 29, concerning the general animus of this account.

pylai force, an extreme step. It seems particularly unlikely that Eurybiades would plan to go back, leaving Leonidas exposed, simply in order not to face Persian ships at the place agreed. And if the commanders at Artemision first chose to withdraw, but then stayed because of bribes, they must have seen themselves as hurting their cities and betraying their own men.[3] Again, the story belongs to a suspect type. Similar stories in Herodotos that give bad private reasons for public actions contemporaries thought good have been discredited: Themistokles' dependence on Mnesiphilos for advice before the battle of Salamis (8.57), Adeimantos' flight from the battle (8.94), Themistokles' secret money-collecting afterward (8.111–112). With them in mind it is much easier not to accept our story.[4]

Besides, there are internal questions. Who are the "Euboians"? Histiaians? Histiaians and Chalkidians? Or Euboians generally?[5] Why have they seen the need for evacuation only in late August 480 after the Greek fleet has already been to Artemision, gone away, and come back? Why do they use the time they buy so badly that Themistokles finds flocks left in northern Euboia after the three days' fighting (8.19–20)? Again, Themistokles persuades Eurybiades for five talents where the Euboians did not persuade him at all; one wonders whether they offered him money or not.[6] What did the other generals think when Themistokles

[3]It is for such reasons that scholars give special explanations of the previous withdrawal, which Herodotos represents as not merely planned but executed, e.g., that Leonidas was not yet at Thermopylai, or that storms blocked Persian advance by sea, or that the manoeuvre answered the Persian attempt to go outside rather than inside Euboia, or that it was conducted by only part of the fleet, or that it was withdrawal only toward rather than all the way to the Euripos. Cf. recently J. A. S. Evans, "Notes on Thermopylai and Artemision," *Historia* 18 (1969) 389–406, and, especially for estimates of distances and times, H. Hörhager, "Zu den Flottenoperationen am Kap Artemision," *Chiron* 3 (1973) 43–60.

[4]Hdt. 8.94 is refuted by Plutarch *dMH* 860b–861a, cf. Burn 458, and below, section 3. For 8.57 see esp. J. R. Grant, "ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΡΑΤΥΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΥΝΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 264–268, and F. J. Frost, "Themistokles and Mnesiphilos," *Historia* 20 (1971) 20–25. For 8.111–112, below, note 15. Cf. also note 7.

[5]Herodotos speaks of "Euboians" only here and in 8.19–20, also referring to Artemision (one exception: 7.156 refers to Euboians in Sicily). Elsewhere he uses the city "ethnics" (thus he speaks of "Histiaia" and "Histiaians" in 8.23–25). One possibility is that he uses the term in 8.4–5 as preparation for the oracle of Bakis in 8.20 ("Histiaia" does not fit a hexameter, so the oracle's own use of "Euboia" is unenlightening), but cf. note 27. And of course withdrawal even to the Euripos would expose most of Chalkis' territory as well as Histiaia's. If that was in Herodotos' mind, however, he might have written "Histiaians and Chalkidians." For the possibility that the Euboian cities (except of course Karystos) were involved collectively see below, note 18.

[6]Perhaps not, perhaps they hit upon the scheme of bribery only after he refused their first request, and preferred to go with it to another commander (a more venal one?). Or perhaps they did, and he was still reluctant—not, one imagines, because of the sum offered, for in the event their purse far exceeds his price, but possibly misdoubting his

and Eurybiades proposed reversing the previous decision to leave? One might expect other comments than Adeimantos'. All these are difficulties with which Herodotos gives the reader no help.

Finally, Themistokles' attitude is unclear. If the Euboian money had made him alter his advice in the council of generals, surely he should have offered Adeimantos his bribe more quietly, and surely he could not call Adeimantos' policy of withdrawal, the common Greek policy of a few hours before, in which presumably he had at least concurred, the policy that the Great King would pay for. If on the other hand Themistokles had already previously been arguing patriotically, as at Salamis, against his colleagues and for a forward stand, then his saying that the King would pay for going back, but he for staying, though provocative, would have been consistent. Besides, if Eurybiades and Adeimantos thought their bribes came from Athens, they surely thought that Athens really favoured fighting at Artemision, which suggests that Themistokles had steadily been proposing that course. But then of what did the Euboians persuade him? Why does the story begin and end with Themistokles' private money-making? One might even conjecture a conflation of two bribery tales: the first denigrating Themistokles' role at Artemision ("Only Euboian money kept him there"), the second denigrating the conduct of the Peloponnesians ("Only their greed outweighed their fear"), and by contrast implicitly favourable to Themistokles ("Wanting to fight there, he bought their acquiescence").

Conjecture aside, we may agree that Herodotos' account of bribery at Artemision is untrustworthy. How did he come to include it? First, we must try to reconstruct what actually happened. The false story itself contains things that one would not attribute to scandal-mongers' invention: in particular why should scandal-mongers represent Themistokles' persuasion of Adeimantos as otherwise than secret? The public discussion and public offer of money ("from Athens") suit a story in which talk about payment for staying at Artemision was not on the face of it corrupt. And the parallel scandals that we cited are generally thought to have been based on actual matters of public knowledge, which however they maliciously misrepresent.[7] Could it have been public fact that Themistokles gave Eurybiades and Adeimantos Euboian money at Artemision

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ability to bring his colleagues round. If so, he was later willing to follow Themistokles where he would not tread alone. One may fill out Herodotos' story either way (but cf. note 19); the point is that Herodotos does not make the situation clear.

[7]Above, note 4. The "public facts" appear to extend at least to an oblique manoeuvre by the Corinthian squadron at Salamis, the prominence of Mnesiphilos as a contemporary Athenian statesman, and the collection of money by forces under Themistokles' command (though perhaps Themistokles had colleagues) from the islanders after Salamis.

and kept some himself? A third consideration suggests that the answer is "yes." The Hellenic League was in northern waters to protect, in the first instance, its extra-Peloponnesian members, and it was normal, when allies went to the assistance of a state, for that state to help support the allied troops.[8] Perhaps, then, the true account of the event which Herodotos' story distorts is that the Athenians, on demand, hand over to the Peloponnesians, and the Euboians to the Athenians, not bribes, but sums which they had agreed to pay as maintenance for the Hellenic League fleet.

2. *Greek Finances at Artemision*

Little, unfortunately, is known about plans for maintaining Greek forces during 480. However, we can at least establish on general grounds the probability that large sums of money would be required. After all, sailors were mostly poor men, and had either to be supported on a campaign or to support themselves from the land. Before the invention of coined money, doubtless ships' crews brought with them, or were given locally, or took by force, whatever they thought they needed. But in the sixth century cash allowances become a possible alternative to maintenance in kind. At the same time the size of navies increased greatly, especially with the spread of the trireme after ca 530.[9] There is no direct evidence that men on active service drew regular stipends until the third quarter of the fifth century,[10] but already in the first quarter the monetary cost of naval expeditions was being carefully considered. For instance, in 500/499 when Aristagoras and his supporters were planning the Ionian Revolt, Hekataios is said to have advised them, if they must fight, to make themselves masters of the sea; the only way, he said, in which he

[8]Cf. Pritchett 46–48, citing *inter alia* Thuc. 4.80.1, 4.83.6, 5.47.6, 8.37.4 (add 6.8, 6.47). Some such provision was included in the mid-century alliance among various Cretan cities and Argos (Meiggs and Lewis, no. 42). One thinks also of the Naxian exiles' promise to Aristagoras, and his subsequent debt to Artaphernes (Hdt. 5.30.6, 31.2, 35.1).

[9]Compare Thucydides' discussion of Agamemnon's difficulties with *trophe* (1.11), and his statement about the growth of navies at the end of the sixth century (1.14—with J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 B.C.* [Cambridge 1968] 129–131, 160–161).

[10]For the direct evidence see Pritchett, chs 1 and 2 (the money given could be called indifferently *misthos*, *sitos*, or *trophe*). Pritchett hypothesizes that there had been *ad hoc* provisioning and no stipends until the introduction of the Periklean principle of compensation for state service, except perhaps to the extent that the establishment of the first Greek standing force, in the Delian Confederacy, may have involved formal recognition of the principle that combatants needed *trophe* (12). One might expect the principle to be recognized in practice already earlier, where rowers were concerned. A fragmentary Eretrian law appears to mention pay (*misthos*) for those who sail abroad (*IG* 12.9.1273–1274.4, late sixth cent., cf. *Hesperia* 33 [1964] 381–391).

saw that coming about was if they took the treasures from the sanctuary at Branchidai (Hdt. 5.36.2–4). The advice was not accepted, but there are other signs of preparations to pay the Ionian fleet. The rebels struck a special electrum coinage—if at one mint, though with various civic types, then for official purposes, for war, for paying combatants; if separately at each city, though coordinating metal, weight, fabric, and style, then at least for a widespread and immediate need, presumably paying combatants.[11] Again, when Miltiades in 489 proposed to the Athenians an expedition against an "unknown objective" (Paros), he naturally asked for ships, men, and money.[12] Lastly, when the Delian League was being established in 478, the finances for a permanent naval force were a primary concern; Thucydides mentions the institution of Treasurers of the Greeks at Athens, to receive allied contributions, and a first assessment of 460 talents—the treasury was at Delos (1.96; cf. Endnote A).

It is against this background that we must consider the probable actions of the Hellenic League. Herodotos first refers to maintenance in Gelon's alleged offer of *sitos* for the whole Greek force for the whole war (7.158.4). However fertile Sicilian fields, Gelon was clearly proposing, not to bring with him all the grain required, but to take the responsibility for seeing that food was obtained and distributed; the natural interpretation is that he would pay for all provisions. In this story the ordinary fighting men are clearly not expected to supply themselves.[13] We get a glimpse of the actual provisioning at Artemision from the story of the cooking of Euboian sheep and goats (8.19). It is set immediately before the retreat, and Themistokles is made to say carefully that the alternatives were consumption on the spot or abandonment to the enemy; the implication is that the Greeks had not previously commandeered supplies locally. Indeed since Euboian cities were contributing forces to the common defence, uncontrolled foraging over their lands was not likely.[14] Herodotos

[11]If there was one mint, it was almost certainly Klazomenai, since there is Klazomenai silver struck from the same obverse die as Revolt electrum (R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* [Oxford 1972] 441–442, J. A. Dengate, *AJA* 72 [1968] 164). Meiggs says that there were "few less likely candidates" for such a mint; but given inter-state rivalries a small city was perhaps even a more likely choice than a large one; the commander-in-chief chosen before Lade was after all from Phokaia. Rather few specimens of the coinage are known for technical arguments concerning the unity or lack of unity of the series (Dengate reports 30 from 9 types).

[12]Hdt. 6.132. The huge fine of 50 T imposed on him for his failure (136.3) is more understandable if viewed as roughly twice the wage bill for 70 ships, each with 200 men, for a month (cf. 135.1), if each man got 2 obols a day (cf. note 16).

[13]The Gelon story may, of course, contain falsehood and even anachronism (the famous phrase "that the spring has been taken out of the year" in 162.1 is often so regarded). What is strictly shown is that those with whom Herodotos discussed Gelon's reply to the Greek envoys believed or found it plausible that the reply dealt with the problem of buying supplies

[14]Forces from Chalkis, Eretria, and Styra are mentioned in 8.1.2, 8.46.2, 9.28.5,

gives us a sidelight on the provisioning at Plataia as well, in saying that the Persians captured 500 beasts, and men following the carts, from what was clearly a Greek supply train (9.39.2). His references are characteristically episodic and incomplete, but the two stories show that as one would expect special arrangements were made for supplying Greek forces in the field.

Now the energetic collections from medizers after Salamis (8.111–112) show that the Greek commanders were concerned to raise money. It is a natural suggestion that this money was used for supplies in 479, both for the army at Plataia and for the fleet at Delos.[15] If the Greeks raised money in late 480 for 479, what preparations did they make for 480? Certainly fourth-century and later authors assumed that money had to be given to rowers for maintenance in 480; the most circumstantial story is the one that eight drachmas were given to each Athenian when Athens was evacuated and all the able-bodied males sent to the naval camp on Salamis. If so, some financial arrangement must have been made for the same men when they served at Artemision earlier in the summer.[16] And if for them, then for the Greek rowers generally, as in all other large fifth-century fleets.

9.31.4; Karystos had submitted to Persia in 490 (6.99) and fought for her at Salamis (8.66.2, cf. 112.2–3). An Eretrian in the war council at Salamis is required for the tale in Plutarch *Themistokles* 11.5. Nothing is said of Histiaian military contributions, but Histiaians must at least be included in the Euboians who give money to Themistokles (8.4–5), their territory is ravaged by Xerxes (8.23.2), and there can be no reasonable doubt that previously they counted as Greek allies. See also notes 5, 18.

[15]The use of the Greek fleet at Andros and Karystos (cf. 8.121) is generally agreed to show that at least some of the demands for money were official, despite Herodotos' attribution of them all to Themistokles' personal greed. The suggestion in the text is that of N. G. L. Hammond, "The Origins and the Nature of the Athenian Alliance of 478/7 B.C.," *JHS* 87 (1967) 54, note 34, an advance on the orthodox view expressed in, e.g., P. A. Brunt, "The Hellenic League against Persia," *Historia* 2 (1953/4) 135–163, who writes of the Delian League, "The provision for financial contributions was inevitable now that the war had shifted to the sea, since fleets were costly to maintain, and it had been foreshadowed in the exactions of 480 . . ." (150); but of the Hellenic League, "each member probably paid for its own forces and there was no need for a common treasury" (138). See also note 19, below.

[16]For the eight drachmas see *Ath. Pol.* 23.1, cf. Kleidemos, *FGrHist* 323 F 21, and Plutarch *Themistokles* 10.3–4 (which mentions also the alleged two-obol maintenance given by Troezen to Athenian families evacuated there), with Pritchett 7, note 14, and 10–11. Cf. also Plutarch *Aristeides* 24.1, "The Greeks had been paying some contribution (*ἀποφοράν*) toward the war even while the Lakedaimonians were leading." It is sometimes, at least, easy to distinguish a realistic from an unrealistic alleged payment. 8 dr. = 24 days × 1/3 dr./day—a realistic maintenance figure for the period Athenian sailors were on duty at Salamis. Phanias of Lesbos said that Themistokles at Artemision bribed one Athenian trireme commander with 1 T because he had no money to pay his sailors (Plutarch *Themistokles* 7)—unrealistic, for it would have been 30 dr. a man or 90 days' maintenance at 1/3 dr. a day (and what of the other 126 Athenian trireme commanders and their crews?). For rates of *trophe*, cf. Endnote A.

The suggested reconstruction is this. In considering the Thermopylai-Artemision line the Greeks surely discussed the problem of finding food for the large forces involved (at Artemision, over 50,000 combatants) and raising money for the food. The Peloponnesians perhaps half thought and doubtless often said that any fighting they might do north of the Isthmus was primarily a favour to their more exposed neighbours. If Themistokles and the Euboian delegates wanted Peloponnesian ships to come to northern Euboia, the least they could do was to provide the normal support due from host states to allied forces that were summoned to protect them.[17] Themistokles agreed to undertake the maintenance of Peloponnesian crews at Artemision (and possibly also agreed that Athens would match the forces contributed by the rest of the allies, ship for ship).[18] He actually supplied eight talents to the Peloponnesians, evidently on their demand,[19] but it was rumoured that he recouped from the Euboians

[17]For "normal support" cf. note 8 and for "Euboian delegates" notes 14, 18. What was said about Peloponnesian hoplites for Thermopylai is less easy to guess, though it is not inconceivable that one official reason why only a few thousand men were sent "as an advance guard" (*πρόδρομοι*, 7.203.1) was the difficulty of finding food for very large numbers of soldiers and their servants in addition to the more than 50,000 sailors stationed nearby, even if the soldiers or their governments paid. Cf. Endnote A.

[18]Perhaps it was agreed or understood that the Euboians would share in the payments. Our bribery story suggests that in the event they supplied all the money, though the Peloponnesians thought they were being paid by Athens. There is no reason to suppose that "Euboians" means anything other than "the Euboian participants in the Hellenic League" (i.e., Histiaia, Chalkis, Eretria, and Styra, above, note 14)—cf. note 27. That these cities acted together in a crisis does not, of course, suggest that they belonged to any local alliance-system or league. On the other hand, the cow coinages of Eretria and Karystos ca 510–490 suggest some sentiment of "Euboian solidarity" (note 34), and the Athenian klerouchy at Chalkis after 506 (?—cf. note 45) would increase that city's receptivity to such notions. Thucydides later notes an Athenian war with Karystos "without the other Euboians" and a conquest of "all Euboia" (Thuc. 1.99.1, 1.114.3, cf. Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 118). To what extent the idea of "Euboianness" received formal expression in the period before the Peloponnesian War must remain obscure.

For the suggestion that some sort of parity between Athenian and non-Athenian ships at Artemision was intended see Burn 382–385. An even simpler explanation than Burn's of the figure of 127 Athenian triremes would be that it matches the total of 124 non-Athenian triremes and 9 non-Athenian pentekonters, given that pentekonters had about a quarter the crew of triremes. Cf. Endnnote A.

[19]If Adeimantos' protest in the bribery story goes back to any fact, it should be to a request for payment on the spot. As G. L. Cawkwell says, "The Corinthians with 40 ships at Artemision (viii 1) were perhaps feeling the pinch." Since Cawkwell's concern is with Themistokles, and specifically Themistokles' decline after Salamis, his remarks about 8.4–5 are necessarily very brief, and I have presented my analysis separately. But I wish to emphasize that the basic idea in the above reconstruction, that "bribery" may be allied finance in malicious disguise, is Cawkwell's (in "The Fall of Themistocles," *Auckland Classical Essays Presented to E. M. Blaiklock* [Auckland and Oxford 1970] 39–58, on page 41).

If Adeimantos was threatening to leave, then the Euboians could not get a pledge from

not only that sum but twenty-two talents more, a figure which may represent the costs of the largely Athenian remainder of the fleet, calculated with some exaggeration. It could be represented that the whole fleet was protecting the Euboians at their invitation, and they were in no position to refuse requests for maintenance. For the record, the sums work out well: Eurybiades' "bribe" bears about the same ratio to Adeimantos' (5:3) as the probable numbers of ships under their direct commands (68:40), and the amount for each rower seems reasonable (ca $2\frac{1}{4}$ drachmas for perhaps nine days). Themistokles' 22 talents are about twice what he would get on a similar basis, but the sum is represented as secret even from the other commanders, so that we may expect exaggeration; also the high figure can be accounted for in several ways (see Endnote A). The transfers of money which appeared so problematic when considered as bribery make very good sense in a context of open and proper Hellenic League financing.

3. *Adeimantos and the Corinthian Contingent in 480*

Accepting some such reconstruction of the financial transactions at Artemision, we might go on to compare Herodotos' distorted account of them with the other passages in which he presents the Greek fleet in 480 and especially its commanders, passages not altogether free of further distortion. The bribery tale epitomizes for the reader Herodotos' picture of the Greeks in the fleet as stumbling into right courses of action despite their timorous reluctance to stand and fight, of Eurybiades as a man unequal to his position, of Adeimantos as the negative genius of the campaign, of Themistokles as a strategist and tactician whose brilliance is matched only by his greed. The celebrated darkness of that picture is one of the abiding themes in Herodotean studies, and it would be rash to attempt any brief discussion of it. However, the roles of Adeimantos and of the Euboians in the 480 campaign are neither of them large, and a few words may be in order about each.

Adeimantos and the Corinthian contingent in fact appear only in four situations: Adeimantos insists on retreat from Artemision, until bribed (8.4–5); the Corinthians were first, as the Athenians last, in the final withdrawal from Artemision (8.21.2); Adeimantos rudely opposed Themistokles and insisted on retreat from Salamis (cf. note 25); Adeimantos and then the other Corinthians fled from the battle of Salamis, according to the Athenians, though the Corinthians themselves say, and the rest of Greece bears witness, that they fought among the foremost (8.94). Given that Adeimantos was not bribed before Artemision and that the

Eurybiades that the fleet would stay until Themistokles had fulfilled his agreement to supply money. And that was more likely after they had given Themistokles their contribution (cf. note 6).

Corinthian manoeuvre at Salamis was not one of flight, the animus in this account is clear. Yet few readers of Herodotos would therefore accuse him of personal prejudice against the Corinthians.[20] So it is usual to suppose that he was misled by partisan sources at Athens. After all, Corinth and Athens were on bad terms at least between ca 461 and 446 and after 433, the Athenians executed Adeimantos' son Aristeus without trial in 430, and Herodotos has mentioned the execution in 7.137.3.[21] Yet why should Herodotos take over a biased Athenian account? He records that the Corinthians and the rest of Greece deny it. Presumably they called his attention to some of the commemorations of the Corinthian achievement at Salamis cited by Plutarch (above, notes 4 and 20), and to other proofs of their claims. He was not unused to conflicting and biased reports; one would expect him to prefer the sound main tradition. Fortunately Herodotos specifically says that his including such a story does not mean that he believes it (7.152). Thus even a reader who did not know, as we know, that the Athenian story is false should still be far from accepting that Herodotos thought it true or intended him to think it true, especially

[20]Plutarch appears to, in *dMH* 870b–871c, cf. 854f (also Favorinus, ps.-Dio Chrysostom 37.7, 18). He refutes the Athenian slander in 8.94 (above, note 4). But his concern is to show that Herodotos "spares no one" (854f), and has told a story here which must blacken someone—the Corinthians if it is believed or the Athenians if it is disbelieved (870d). Such conduct would not show particular malice against Corinth. In fact, of course, Herodotos is careful to record also good actions: in the Corinthians' case, their just opposition to Kleomenes (5.75, 92), and their valour at Mykale (9.105).

Notoriously Plutarch's claims in *dMH* are not dispassionate (a recent editor apologetically pictures Plutarch's admirers wondering how he "could himself write with such fierce malice"—L. Pearson, *Plutarch's Moralia* 11 [London and Cambridge 1970, Loeb Classical Library] 3). Two details about his sources in this section arouse particular suspicion. (1) He cites no authors, though elsewhere in the work he displays his erudition (e.g., for Eretria, 861c, esp. the only surviving fragment of Lysanias of Mallos = *FGrHist* 426 F 1; for Naxos, 869a–c, esp. "Naxian chroniclers"). Yet the defence is long and particularly well-informed (Adeimantos' three daughters' names were surely first cited in this connexion by some early writer). (2) One of the epigrams occurs also in Theopompos (871b, *FGrHist* 115 F 285). Theopompos is Plutarch's type of the malicious historian (855a). His attack on Athenian lies about the Persian Wars was famous (F 153), and one might tentatively assign F 285 to it (W. R. Connor, *Theopompos and Fifth-Century Athens* [Washington, D.C. 1968] 97). He had epitomized Herodotos, T 1, F 1–4. Is Plutarch borrowing a famous refutation of Herodotos' malice against Corinth by a successor whose malice was famous? One can see why he might not acknowledge this source. And if he shows fierce malice citing malicious attacks on Herodotos' malice, it would be only kind to ask whether it is conscious mock-malice.

[21]H. D. Westlake, "Aristeus the son of Adeimantos," *CQ* 41 (1947) = *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester 1969) 74–83, makes the sound point that the time of Aristeus' unpopularity ca 432–430 is rather late for the denigratory version to appear for the first time and still become widespread. Indeed, it seems not unlikely that it goes back to the battle itself, and only achieved more prominence as Athenian attitudes to Corinth and to the family of Adeimantos became sourer.

in view of the expressed *caveat* that the Corinthians and the rest of Greece contradicted it. He would be faced rather with the problem why Herodotos gave so questionable a story such prominence.

One or two small points encourage doubt that Herodotos' sole concern in portraying Adeimantos and the Corinthians is to give the facts as he sees them. Why does he mention the order of the withdrawal from Artemision at all, when he has not even bothered with the Greek order during the fighting? If the remark has any effect, it is, as Plutarch complains, to associate the Corinthians with retreat.[22] Yet the normal position of the Corinthian ships in 480 was probably on the left wing of the Greek fleet, which would naturally lead in a withdrawal from Artemision southward.[23] Herodotos has gone slightly out of his way to include an item which appears to invite a somewhat derogatory inference, but does not draw the inference, which he may even know to be unfair.[24] More strikingly, in the deliberations before Artemision Herodotos indicates Adeimantos' substantive position very briefly and with considerable indirection, but quotes in direct discourse two rude and futile procedural objections, both of which Themistokles firmly quashes (8.59, 61).[25]

[22]Plutarch *dMH* 868a. Not all of Plutarch's complaints in *dMH* need be taken very serously (cf. note 20), but he actually believed that the order of retreat from Artemision was indicative of relative courage, for in *Themistokles* 9.1 he says that the Athenian position ἐπὶ πᾶσι τεταγμένον was δι' ἀρετήν. Thus the passage in Herodotos would really appear to at least one Greek reader to associate the Corinthians with retreat.

[23]The Corinthians at Artemision provide the second-largest contingent, and the largest from the Peloponnesos (8.1). Both the debates in Herodotos' narrative and the Serpent Column (Meiggs and Lewis, no. 27) support the inference that they ranked in importance immediately after the Athenians. Position in the battle line was cherished (cf. Herodotos' account of the competition for the left wing at Plataia, 9.26–28.1). And the Corinthians clearly held the left at Salamis (Burn 458 suggests "for convenience of communication with Corinth"—unnecessarily).

[24]If in including the item he considered it for a moment he would realize that the Corinthians might well have led as a matter of course; if he discussed it at all with the sources that vindicated to him Corinthian conduct at Salamis (Endnote B), they would point out these considerations.

[25]Opinions in the first council at Salamis are not specifically attributed: the consensus was for withdrawal to the Isthmus, and Peloponnesian commanders were responsible (8.49.2–50.1). Adeimantos is of course the commander of the largest Peloponnesian contingent, and the only Peloponnesian commander (apart from Eurybiades) whom we have met before. Aristeides is later made to gloss "Peloponnesians" by "Corinthians and Eurybiades himself" when announcing that such talk of withdrawal is no longer relevant in view of Persian encirclement (8.79.4).

As to Adeimantos' procedural points (8.59, 61), it seems unlikely that Herodotos should have authentic reports of meetings of the high command so detailed as to show that Adeimantos' contribution was precisely this. In general, Herodotos' direct speech and dialogue surely owes more to epic and tragic practice than to annals—*non è vero si è ben trovato*, cf. A. R. Burn, *JHS* 89 (1969) 119, "he 'knows' too much," R. Lattimore, "The Wise Adviser in Herodotos," *CP* 34 (1939) 24–35, also note 28, below.

Perhaps one part of Herodotos' intention is to illustrate moral psychology, to offer a literary treatment of the bare historical bones of the campaign that helped readers appreciate vividly the range of response to the Persian advance. Some Greeks felt fear, planned withdrawal, counted pecuniary gain, advocated a rearward line, browbeat braver colleagues, flinched from battle. Brevity and art lead Herodotos to present these reactions directly, rather than through the medium of, say, an analytical essay. The choice of Corinthian speeches and actions is presumably an historical one; presumably the senior commander to speak negatively was Adeimantos and presumably his contingent went where Herodotos says it went. But he uses this handful of facts to create a psychological portrait that ignores the literal truth of particular interpretations in order to give a true impression of the type. The reader doesn't have to believe that the Corinthians failed to fight at Salamis, but he comes to see what sorts of negative response were made in 480, and clustered around the name of Adeimantos in an Athenian tradition of events.[26]

4. *The Euboian Resistance to Persia*

Herodotos mentions Euboians particularly in his account of the campaigns of 480 and 479 only for their failure to have evacuated the northern part of the island before Artemision, their consequent bribing of Themistokles and loss of their flocks, and the ravaging of their lands by Xerxes (8.4–5, 19–20, 23). It is not a noble role, and Herodotos underlines Euboian folly. If we are right in thinking the bribery story a serious distortion of what actually took place, unfairness to Euboians as well as to Corinthians and others is certainly involved. But it is a minor unfairness and elsewhere Herodotos shows no bias in relating Euboian matters. Even less than in Corinth's case would any one suggest here that he is unfair through personal animus. It remains possible that he was at the mercy of sources prejudiced against Euboia, but much the more likely explanation

[26] K. von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* 1 (Berlin 1967) 266 and n. 87, suggests that Herodotos wishes to portray as a negative aspect of Greek *eleutheria* the concentration of each state upon its own parochial interests, and is led accordingly to introduce such doubtful stories as those about Mnesiphilos and Adeimantos at Salamis. Cf. the discussion ending on page 441 of the "Widerstreit zwischen dem Streben nach Sorgfalt im Sammeln und Berücksichtigen verschiedener Versionen der Überlieferung und dem Wunsch, das historisch Bedeutsame als das Wirchliche herauszustellen." By making readers pause over the Athenian story, opposed as it is to the main Greek tradition, Herodotos of course offers also a second-level *datum* concerning the strength of parochial outlooks, but it cannot be his main purpose to do so, since the story so clearly fits within his general picture of the fleet in 480, most of which he gives *in propria persona*.

is that he simply did not think about the situation from its Euboian angle. The story he chooses of the Artemision deliberations, because he wishes to portray negative tendencies in the Greek fleet, commits him to a certain picture of how the Euboians behaved, and the picture aptly introduces a divine prophecy he knows, which they neglected.[27]

This feature in Herodotos' method of telling stories may be underlined. A minor figure or minor event is presented to the extent and from the angle that the main interest of the scene demands. Neither audience nor author treats it as fully real and existent in its own right. Here Herodotos has got something wrong about the Euboians and their money, for he makes the payments a cause not a consequence of the fighting at Artemision. If one asks about previous arrangements for the fleet to be based in northern Euboia, it is at once clear that the last-minute bribe fits no natural background. One can hardly doubt, in fact, that there were Chalkidian and Eretrian representatives among "those of the Greeks who had the better opinion about Greece" in winter 481/0 (7.145.1), and the strong presumption is that there were Histiaians and Styrans as well, at least in the meeting that decided upon the Thermopylai-Artemision line in early summer 480. We have suggested that these Euboians were in some sense the hosts of the Greek fleet while it was in Euboian waters, and accordingly supplied funds for its maintenance; obviously in addition they will have provided other services, among which may be mentioned scouts and signallers on the heights of Euboia (Hdt. 7.183.1, 192.1). The evacuation of civilians and especially of food supplies from the area of the great camp at Artemision before the last possible moment would have been most inhospitable acts. But the attention of both Herodotos (one suspects) and his audience is focussed on the foreground, on Greek weaknesses of character in the face of the Barbarian, and such questions about previous planning seem inappropriate and somewhat irrelevant. The scene invites being read in ways appropriate to fiction rather than to history. If Adeimantos and the Corinthians had the misfortune to be the most suitable actors for casting in a negative role, our poor Euboians are even more ignominiously dramatized as supers, *koupha prosopa*, coming out from the shadows with a purse of gold, forgotten the moment they leave the stage. If Herodotos disposes his narrative with the skills of a

[27]Given Herodotos' pervasive interest in what passed for supernatural, and his particularly credulous acceptance of Bakis' oracles (8.77, cf. also 8.96, 9.43), the inclusion of 8.19–20 needs no external explanation, though it will have done no harm that the passage coheres so well with 8.4–5. I do not think that the reverse connexion is sufficiently strong to substantiate any suggestion that 8.4–5 were included for the sake of preparing 8.19–20. The slightly surprising appearance of the word "Euboians" in 8.19 may well be produced by the oracle, but "Euboians" in 8.4–5 is a natural use (above, note 18) and need have no connexion with 8.20 (cf. note 5).

playwright, we must expect sometimes not to see clearly what lies *exo tou dramatos*.[28]

It is not surprising that the Euboians are not seen again in 480 after the scene has shifted southward, but it means that we must look elsewhere in Herodotos for parallels, and the obvious place is the narrative of the 490 campaign. The Persians come against Eretria and Athens (6.94.2). They ravage Naxos but spare Delos (6.95–98). Then they

> ... came also to Karystos ... the Karystians ... refused to serve in an expedition against cities that were their neighbours, meaning Eretria and Athens ... they besieged the people and laid waste their land, until the Karystians too came over ... the Eretrians, learning that the Persian force was sailing against them, asked the Athenians to come to their aid. And the Athenians ... sent ... the 4,000 that were holding the land of the Chalkidian Hippobotai in lots. But the Eretrians had, indeed, no healthy resolution; they summoned the Athenians but contemplated two ideas, for some of them wished to leave the city for the heights of Euboia, but others, expecting to win private gain from the Persians, prepared treachery ... Aischines son of Nothon ... tells the arriving Athenians the whole current state of affairs, and begs them to depart ... And the Athenians follow this advice of Aischines ... (6.99.2–100.3).

The Persians land. After six days' fighting Eretria is duly handed over (6.101).

At first sight the Karystians seem more resolute than one might have expected, and the Eretrians less resolute. Analysis only encourages one's doubts. When Eretria sent for help and the klerouchs came, what was intended? One would expect defence of the walls. It was not easy to lay successful siege to contemporary cities; indeed ten years earlier Megabates had been unable to take Naxos in four months' siege (5.34).[29] 4,000 loyal Athenians might check any proposed treachery, especially if

[28]In this episode, at least, realistic questions asked from other angles than the main one prove subversive, almost as the question whether the scene of Helen and Priam on the walls suits the tenth year of the Trojan War is subversive, or the question what effect Hippolytos' bastard birth may have upon his character (cf. A. J. A. Waldock, *Sophocles the Dramatist* [Cambridge 1951] ch. 2, "The Documentary Fallacy"). For other directly presented scenes of speech or discussion cf. note 25.

[29]Similarly Athens, despite her subsequent reputation in such matters (Thuc. 1.102.2, by 462), failed at Paros in 489, Andros and Karystos in 480, and perhaps Karystos again ca 470 (Hdt. 6.133–135; 8.111–112, 121; 9.105; Thuc. 1.98.3). Of course, Miltiades' siege was raised after 26 days (above, note 12), and Themistokles' efforts were presumably briefer yet. Successful sieges later in the fifth century lasted from six months upward: Thasos, 464–462 (?), Thuc. 1.101.3 *τρίτῳ ἔτει*; Aigina, 458–457 (?), Thuc. 1.105.2 and 108.4, Diod. 11.78.4 *μῆνας ἐννέα*; Samos, 440–439, Thuc. 1.117.8 *ἐνάτῳ μηνί*; Potidaia, 432–430, Thuc. 1.64.2, 2.70.1–2; Plataia, 429–427, Thuc. 2.75.3, 3.52.1; Mytilene, 428–427, Thuc. 3.18.3–5, 28.1; Skione, 423–421, Thuc. 4.133.4, 5.33.1, cf. Ar. *Vespae* 209; Melos, 416–415, Thuc. 5.84, 114–116, cf. Ar. *Aves* 168; Athens, 405–404, Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.10, 16, 23. Doubtless much depended on whether the city attacked had adequate warning (cf. Hdt. on Naxos and Paros) and was not placed under siege until after harvest, or the reverse. Eretria was in the favourable position.

stationed at the gates. Why should patriots prefer to dismiss the klerouchs and give the city to Persia? The majority of Eretrians was in fact prepared to fight; they defended their city for six days without the Athenians. Herodotos' implied view of the chances for resistance is too pessimistic. Again, no one accuses him of personal animus against Eretrians,[30] and some have hypothesized that he was misled by tainted sources,[31] but an easier explanation is that he has gone astray by mentioning Eretrian behaviour only in the two weeks before the city falls. He observes the city simply as reacting, first to the Persians and then to the klerouchs, and so fails to ask and answer necessary questions about her planning.

Fairly extensive planning had probably taken place. Naxos, Eretria, and Athens had been in a state of war with Persia for some years. The defeat at Lade, the fall of Miletos, and the pacification of Ionia left the Persians free to deal with their European enemies, and Herodotos represents the expedition of Mardonios in 492 as directed against Eretria and Athens (6.43.4).[32] The usual view which makes 493 a year of intense

[30]Even Plutarch is willing to pass over the calling of the Eretrians taken prisoner in 490 slaves (Hdt. 6.115, Plut. *dMH* 862d), and the omission of a celebrated Eretrian naval victory off Pamphylia in 498 he rightly ascribes (*dMH* 861b–c) to Herodotos' general attitude toward the Ionian Revolt (much discussed recently—see last G. A. Chapman, "Herodotos and Histiaeus' Role in the Ionian Revolt", *Historia* 21 [1972] 546–568, with references). We might add that Herodotos makes the Athenians describe Eretria as a notable city (6.106 πόλι λογίμῳ), and memorializes the death of Eualkides (see also Endnote B).

[31]Macan *ad loc.* (followed very closely by How and Wells) claims that "The apologetic tendency of this story is patent." He also very pertinently asks why the Eretrian patriots who proposed that the Athenians leave did not in fact go with them or leave separately.

In retrospect the decision to stay and man the walls had failed, and caused the taking of many Eretrians captive into Asia who might otherwise have escaped. And the klerouchs who had not helped Eretria as they had been sent to do might exaggerate whatever could be called unhealthy there. So both Eretrian and Athenian sources may have coloured their accounts.

Herodotos himself perhaps accepts the view that manning the walls was an inadequate policy the more easily because of personal approval for those Greeks who were willing to leave their states as the price of freedom from Persia (ca 546 Phokaians, 1.162–167, Teians 1.168–169; ca 494 Dionysios of Phokaia with three ships, 6.17, Samian men of property, 6.22–25). He also carefully notes temporary flight to the hills to avoid subjection (e.g., at Naxos in 490, 6.96, in Phokis in 480, 8.32). The Themistoklean strategy at Athens of course combines the two: temporary abandonment of the city, with migration west contemplated in case of necessity (8.62.2). In 490 the Athenians behave with more panache than the Eretrians, marching out to Marathon and giving battle, and Herodotos is convinced that they had to give battle to avoid medizing (6.109). At Eretria he notes that the policy of defending the walls prevented any decision to march out and offer battle (6.101.2), though it is hard in fact to believe that any force strong and resolute enough to do that could not have held the walls even against treachery. But the main point is not that Herodotos' account is too severe, but that it is unclear.

[32]The scope of Mardonios' first expedition has been much discussed, cf. esp. H. U. Instinsky, "Herodot und der Erste Zug des Mardonios gegen Griechenland," *Hermes* 84

debate at Athens about possible resistance to Persia seems to me adequately based;[33] certainly by whatever date in 491 Aigina gave earth and water but Athens and Sparta did not (6.48–49, 7.133), Persian attack must have been expected. Herodotos' readers do not have any immediate reason to ask themselves whether Eretria and Karystos were asked for earth and water too, and whether they refused, but if the questions occur to them, the reasonable answers are surely "yes." Then the events of 490 cannot be understood only in light of the immediate situation. The decisions to resist were taken, or reaffirmed, in 491. In particular so small a state as Karystos was not likely to adopt an exceptionally intransigent attitude entirely without reference to her larger neighbours' plans,[34] and

(1956) 477–494. For us it does not much matter whether Mardonios meant to take military action as far south as Eretria and Athens; Dareios' ultimate purpose was to humble them and overawe their neighbours, as the 490 campaign shows. A Persian fleet beginning to round Athos was sufficient cause for immediate alarm, and underlined the fact that the Great King was not an enemy to ignore; some position had to be taken.

[33] Wade-Gery, *Essays* 165, 177–178, *pace* E. Badian, "Archons and *Strategoi*," *Antichthon* 5 (1971) 7, 15 and note 44. While reconstructions of Athenian public life from 510 to 480 have often been absurdly speculative, it may be thought that Badian presses scepticism about 493 too far. Miltiades' trial should come soon after his arrival in Athens, the capture of Miletos was a personal grief to the Athenians of a more immediate sort before Marathon than after Salamis and Herodotos in 6.21 implies that Phrynichos' condemnation was the result of an immediate reaction to it (just as Milesians shaved their heads when Sybaris fell), and Thucydides thought that Themistokles was responsible for the beginning of the fortifications of the Peiraieus (1.93.3, granted by Badian, 8) in what was surely his archonship in 493/2 (see now *Historia* 22 [1973] 757, 758). How important the archonship was in this period it is difficult to say, but we can infer that Themistokles obtained election to it by political activity, for his birth was not high enough to entitle him, if birth ever entitled anyone, to hold such office as of right. The "highly respectable scholars" who "used to" refer to Themistokles as a *novus homo* perhaps had in mind the widespread later tradition of his humble birth echoed in, e.g., Plutarch *Themistokles* 1–2, 6, and were not relying on Hdt. 7.153 "and nothing else" (Badian 7)—see now W. R. Connor, *Historia* 21 (1972) 569–574.

[34] "Many of the mainlanders and . . . all the islanders gave that were asked" (6.49), and Datis and Artaphernes collected hostages and military forces from them the next summer (6.99.1); doubtless Karystos' immediate neighbour Andros was included. Karystos' first coins are the only scrap of evidence for her politics before 490 (see my unpublished dissertation, *The History of Karystos from the Sixth to the Fourth Centuries B.C.*, Toronto 1972, esp. 13–17, 126–138, 338–342). Their date may be accepted as ca 500 (W. P. Wallace, "The Early Coinages of Athens and Euboia," *NC* 1962.23–42, 41), with extreme limits 530–470. The eight specimens known to me attest one tetradrachm and five didrachm anvils, pointing to an issue of some volume (the well-preserved and better known fourth-century ΚΑΡΤΣ and ΚΑΡΤΣΤΙΩΝ didrachm series were each effectively two-anvil issues). The choice of cow (later, cow and calf) and cock for anvil and punch types is reminiscent of Eretria's cow and sepia coinage, especially as cock and sepia are probably both types of distinctively local reference (*NC* 1962.38, 41). If the punches refer to the issuing city, the cow should indicate Euboia. Especially when Athens had recently adopted distinctive national coin types, and Chalkis had issued a coin marking association with the Boiotian League, it is doubtful that the appearance of two such parallel Euboian cow coinages with local

the intended disposition of the large number of Athenian troops resident on Eretrian borders, at Chalkis, was surely a matter of mutual concern to the two cities. One may hypothesize various consultations. Euboian behaviour in 490 could only be properly understood against the background of what had been planned ahead of time. Neither for 480 nor for 490 has Herodotos reconstructed and presented the logic behind Euboian involvement in relevant events.

This is how Euboians are treated also elsewhere in Herodotos. For instance, he only once mentions Chalkis other than incidentally, in the story of the "Triple Attack" on Athens ca 506 (5.74–78).[35] The main themes are Kleomenes' failure and Athens' success. Nothing is said to explain the Chalkidians' actions. They appear abruptly, ravaging northern Attica (5.74). When the Athenians are ready to punish them, they are to be found back on the Euboian side of the Euripos. The Boiotians try to help them—nothing is said of Chalkis' neighbour, Eretria—but they fail; the Chalkidians are quickly beaten and four thousand klerouchs settled on the land of their Hippobotai (5.77.1–2). Scholars have accounted for Chalkis' involvement by suggesting that she was then a formal ally or even a member of the Boiotian League, and have guessed that fear of Eretria prevented a united stand across the Euripos with Boiotian League forces.[36] Whatever the missing explanation, Herodotos' presentation deserves comment. He wishes to record Athens' victory. That requires some statement of what happened to Chalkis. The audience would expect motivation for Athens' attack on Chalkis. That they get in a statement of Chalkidian aggression. These two statements include not one supererogatory detail about Chalkis, and thus produce a story which makes sense from the Athenian side, but as an account of Chalkis' involvement is too brief to be understood by itself.[37]

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punch types was an accident. Perhaps Karystos chose as she did because of Eretria's choice, indicating at the very least a certain fellow-feeling.

[35]For the date see note 45. The reference back to 5.74–77 in 5.91.2 adds nothing.

[36]Recent discussion with references in W. P. Wallace, *NC* 1962.38–40 (cf. M. Miller, below, note 43, 41–43).

[37]Even within Herodotos' narrative the meagreness of this account may be compared with the brief but more solid presentation of the Boiotian role. It is stated that they act *ἀπὸ συνθήματος* (the sentence probably implies that the Chalkidians did too, but for them it remains an implication). The border villages they attack are named (74). Their reaction to the Athenian punitive expedition is given (77.1). Their losses are specified as "very many dead and 700 captured alive" (77.2). Herodotos of course had visited Thebes (Endnote B). There is no evidence that he had been to Chalkis or talked to Chalkidians; the local word "Hippobotai" for Chalkidian nobles may well have figured in an Athenian story. Certainly *παχεῖς* is not distinctively Chalkidian and is a familiar Athenian colloquialism (Ar. *Vespae* 287, *Pax* 639). Herodotos uses it elsewhere (of Naxians [5.30.1], Aiginetans [6.91.1], and Sicilian Megarians [7.156.2]), and Herodotos had seen the Athenian victory-monument on the Acropolis (5.77, in a reconstruction after 446 or perhaps 457, Meiggs and Lewis, no. 15).

5. *The West Aegean and Dareios*

Herodotos, then, is indifferent to parochial Euboian concerns. The fall of Karystos and of Eretria in 490 and the presence of the Greeks at Artemision belong to his main narrative, and are treated with no more depth than it absolutely requires. A possible Persian threat to Euboia before 500 (5.31.3) and Eretrian aid to Ionia in 498 (5.99.1) help explain the main narrative. Nor does any other Euboian item earn inclusion except as explanatory or illustrative material for more central themes. We hear that the Greeks attacked Karystos in late 480 (8.112.2–3, 121) because Themistokles (allegedly) extorted money thence, and that Athens fought another war with Karystos some years later (9.105) because the valiant Hermolykos died there. So, too, Athens' defeat of Chalkis ca 506 was a vindication of her *isegoria* (5.74–77), the sufferings of northern Euboia in 480 helped justify *chresmoi* (8.19–20), and men like Eualkidas deserved to have their names recorded (5.102.3).[38] This massive indifference to local affairs holds good also for the Cyclades (with the natural exception of Delos).[39]

In general, the broad scope and comparative brevity of Herodotos' work obviously necessitates and justifies his selectivity and his concentration on central themes. And this is largely so for his treatment of Euboia and the Cyclades in the 490 and 480 campaigns. Herodotos' brilliancy of narrative is at worst venially or even trivially flawed by any failure to present Euboians in the round. But there is one part of the story where he appears to neglect the west-central Aegean seriously. Peisistratos subdued Naxos in his third tyranny and handed it over to his supporter Lygdamis. He also purified Delos, and Eretria was evidently friendly to him.[40] When not very long afterwards his sons succeeded him, they too presumably dominated the Athens-Eretria-Naxos triangle, just as they maintained their father's interests in the Troad, the Thrakian

[38]Mere background information includes the mentions of Chalkidians, Eretrians, and Styrans in the contingent-lists for Artemision, Salamis, and Plataia (8.1, 8.46, 9.28, cf. 9.31); purely geographical references to the Euripos (7.173.1, 183.1, 8.7.1, 15.2, 66.1), Chalkis (7.183.1, 189.2, 8.44.1), Histiaia (7.175.2, 8.23–25, 66.1), and Euboia (7.176.1, 183.1, 189.2, 8.4.2, 6.1, 7.1, 8.3, 13, 14.1, 2, [20.2], 68α1, 69.2, 86, cf. 7.192.1) in the 480 campaign; the mentions of Chalkis to locate Delion (6.118.2) and of Styra to locate Aigilia (6.107.2); ethnographic (1.146.1, 8.46.2) and genealogical (6.127.4, 5.57.1) notes; and references to Peisistratos at Eretria (1.61.2, 62.1), the Euboian talent (3.89.2, 95.1,2), the route of the Hyperborean offerings to Delos (4.33.2), the Lelantine War (5.99.1), and Euboians in Sicily (7.156.3).

[39]As may be seen from the index of proper names in the OCT. Amorgos, Gyaros, Ios, and Syros do not appear at all. Keos, Kythnos, Mykonos, Rheneia, and Seriphos earn a total of eight bare mentions. Andros, Siphnos, and Tenos do slightly better, chiefly because of Themistokles' attack on Andros (8.111–112, cf. 121), the Samian oligarchs' attack on Siphnos (3.57–58), and the Tenian ship at Salamis (8.82–83).

[40]Hdt. 1.61–64, Thuc. 3.104.1–2, *Ath. Pol.* 15.2–3, Aristotle *Pol.* 1305a41.

Chersonese, and doubtless the Pangaion area.[41] Dareios' Skythian expedition constitutes a major fixed point in Hippias' foreign diplomacy. It established Dareios as the effective overlord of the areas in Thrace and the Hellespont region where Hippias' interests lay (5.1–2, 11–16, 26–27), and whatever his previous relations with Persia, from then on Hippias becomes Dareios' client and dependent. Herodotos omits this vital fact, and the clinching evidence, Hippias' marriage of his daughter Archedike to the son of the tyrant of Lampsakos, "knowing that he was in great favour with Dareios," is left for Thucydides to supply (6.56). Hippias' position was also threatened internally by restless Athenian nobles and externally by an unwontedly activist Sparta, and it was these two forces that combined to drive him out; Herodotos' retrospect of Athenian affairs before 500 therefore concentrates on them. Nevertheless, he does make the point that after his expulsion Hippias went first to Sigeion but later to the court of Dareios, that he tried to get himself reinstated as a pro-Persian tyrant at Athens, and that Artaphernes eventually ordered the Athenians to take him back "if they wanted to be safe."[42] But the brief retrospect of Naxian affairs before 500 says nothing of Lygdamis' position vis-à-vis Dareios, nor of his expulsion, also by Sparta and in favour of local nobles, nor of Persian relations with Naxos between the expulsion and 500.[43] And there is no retrospect of Eretrian affairs at all, so that we can only hypothesize a parallel fall of the friends of Peisistratos at the hands of the friends of Sparta, and possibly as well something of the same development from a more aristocratic to a more democratic régime that occurred both in Athens and in Naxos.[44] A modern reader

[41]For Peisistratid interests in the north and north-east Aegean, see Wade-Gery, *Essays*, 163–166, and note 40, above.

[42]Hdt. 5.65, 91, 94, 96; Thuc. 6.56.

[43]The expulsion of Lygdamis is preserved in the list of tyrants put down by Sparta in Plutarch *dMH* 859d, schol. Aischines 2.77 (cf. *PRylands* 18). The chronological problems have been much discussed, last by D. M. Leahy, "The Dating of the Orthagorid Dynasty," *Historia* 17 (1968) 1–23; contrast M. E. White, "The Dates of the Orthagorids," *Phoenix* 12 (1958) 1–14, who plausibly dates the deposition of Aischines of Sikyon just after that of Hippias. Whatever view is taken of Sikyonian dates, there is general willingness to accept that Lygdamis' deposition was shortly before Hippias'. Some scholars associate it with Sparta's attack on Polykrates in 524, e.g., H. W. Parke, "Polykrates and Delos," *CQ* 40 (1946) 105–108, but others, e.g., Leahy, *op. cit.*, note 25, associate it with the Spartan thalassocracy of ca 517–515; for recent discussion of the Eusebian thalassocracy lists, W. G. Forrest, *CQ* 19 (1969) 95–110, M. Miller, *The Thalassocracies: Studies in Chronography 2* (Albany, N.Y. 1971). On problems of dating see also note 45 below.

[44]Herodotos may provide us with an inference from silence; it is striking that Eretria fails to appear in his itineraries for Hippias (note 42, above). We have no date for the transition of Eretria to democracy under the leadership of a certain Diagoras (Aristotle *Pol.* 1306a35; he died in Corinth on an errand to Sparta, Herakleides Pontikos, *FHG* 2.217). The provisions for pay in *IG* 12.9.1273–1274.4 (above, note 10) are our only

may be tempted to conjecture that Persia nevertheless still thought Hippias' friends should rule in Naxos and in Eretria, as they thought he should rule himself at Athens.

For a few years relations with Persia were evidently in flux.[45] One notes that at Naxos the oligarchs were friends of Histiaios (5.30.1), and the democracy at Athens actually sent to Artaphernes envoys who gave earth and water (5.73). The envoys got into trouble on their return, it was said, but then the whole survival of the democracy was threatened by the Triple Attack (above, 37), and later Kleomenes even toyed with the idea of reinstating Hippias (5.91); it was only after this that the aged exile settled down in Asia Minor to poison Artaphernes' mind, and Artaphernes sent Athens his uncompromising reply to their hopeful request that he ignore Hippias (5.96). It was not until almost 500 that Persia's friends in the west Aegean were finally seen to be impotent without her: Hippias could do no more, and Histiaios' friends had just been expelled from Naxos. Persia acted diplomatically against Athens and militarily against Naxos, with an eye kept open, Herodotos alleges, to the possibility of subsequent Cycladic and Euboian conquests (5.31.2). If all Artaphernes' plans were implemented, the whole former Peisistratid sphere of influence would have come under Persian overlordship—as both Hippias and Dareios had surely intended for a long time.

The first move was against Naxos—the Naxians resisted. The Greeks under Persian rule, including Miltiades, revolted, and Artaphernes' two secondary targets, Athens and Eretria, joined in the war. One can only speculate whether Naxos, Eretria, and Athens acted together out of any agreement, such as appears to have been made between Athens and the Ionians of Asia Minor (5.103.1), or even from an alliance, or whether each thought only of its own position and concerns; there are very faint traces of Eretrian support both of Athenian and of Naxian democrats in the previous few years,[46] and the three states might be expected to cooperate

contemporary document. Our main fact is that Eretria emerges with a government hostile to Persia and presumably Hippias and friendly to the Naxian and Athenian democracies by 500 (see also note 46).

[45]One of the symptoms of Herodotos' neglect of this period is his compressed chronology; older scholars used to bring the Skythian Expedition down as late as 508 to suit his narrative, though in fact it probably dates to 514 (Wade-Gery, *Essays* 159–161) or even as early as 519 (J. M. Balcer, *HSCP* 26 [1972] 99–132). The true date makes the *οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον* of 5.28.1 not two years (as Clinton's *Fasti* had it) but at least twelve. It imposes a gap either between Kleomenes' last two initiatives against Athens (5.74–77, 91) or between Hippias' return to Asia and Artaphernes' ultimatum (5.94, 96) which the reader does not expect. It also makes Kleomenes' reign for *οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον* (5.48), although he entertained Skythian envoys at the time of Dareios' expedition (6.84), a blunder.

[46]Eretria needs some events to justify her thalassocracy. For the suggestion that the Athenians were assisted at the time of the Triple Attack by Chalkis' fear of Eretria,

in resisting Artaphernes' western plans. They are, then, the states of Old Greece that are under threat in 500, that join the Ionians in the rising of 499–494, that, with their dependents Karystos, the klerouchy at Chalkis, and Plataia (but *not* Paros) are attacked by Datis and Artaphernes in 490—and their liberator Sparta sides with them—, that may fairly be said to have converted the troubles of the Asian Ionians (5.28, 31.1) into the troubles of the Greeks (5.97.3). Should Herodotos not have saved us from mere conjecture as to their relations with Persia between the Skythian expedition and the immediate preliminaries to the Ionian Revolt?

Endnote A—The Sums in the Bribery Story:

We may calculate maintenance payments by multiplying number of ships by number of men by number of days by amount of daily allowance or stipend. Of the three commanders involved in our story we know that Adeimantos had 40 triremes, and we may suppose that Eurybiades was directly responsible for 68 (20 Megarian, 18 Aiginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lakonian, and 8 Epidaurian) and that Themistokles was responsible for the remaining 163 triremes + 9 pentekonters = 165¼ trireme equivalents (127 Athenian, 5 Troezenian, 20 "Chalkidian," 7 Eretrian, 2 Styran and 2 Kean triremes, 2 Kean and 7 Lokrian pentekonters)—cf. Hdt. 8.1. The number of men per trireme is often thought to have been 200 (8.17). The number of days for which the Greek fleet could be said to be effectively at Artemision or protecting Euboia is small but debatable. The stipend was surely not more than the probable basic naval *misthos* in the Peloponnesian War of 3 obols a day (cf. Pritchett 16–18, 23–24).

If we test the hypothesis that Adeimantos' 3 T was a maintenance payment our calculation will be that 3 T = 18,000 dr. is given to 40 × 200 = 8,000 men. Each man gets 2¼ dr. = ½ dr. a day for 4½ days, ⅓ dr. a day for 6¾ days, or ¼ dr. a day for 9 days. We should not suppose calculations in fractions of days. 9 days would suit first arrival at Artemision on Day 12 of the Diary and last departure on Day 20 (e.g., Burn 396); since the day of departure was probably not known beforehand, this assumes that the story is *post eventum* to the extent of giving figures for the total actual payments that were finally made.

Now Themistokles' proper payment may be found from the proportion 40:"66⅔":"165"::3:5:12⅜ (Eurybiades of course actually having 68 trireme crews and Themistokles 165¼). But Themistokles is said to get not 12⅜ but 22 T. Even gossip would hardly allege that he imposed on the

see note 36 (the prows dedicated at the Athenian Stoa would prove a naval engagement, if the date could be established, but cf. Meiggs and Lewis, no. 25). The Naxian oligarchs lost their thalassocracy in 505; it would be very tidy if Eretria's display of naval power were against them.

Euboians with great lies about numbers of ships or men per ship or even days' service. Conceivably, he was said to have got a full *trophe* for his men at 3 obols = 1/2 dr. a day, and only an agreed half *trophe* for the others (if, for instance, the Peloponnesian states had agreed to match the local contribution of 1 1/2 obols per man per day for their crews); if so, his total exaction of about 33 T was rounded off in the story to 30 T. Again, Athens had possible extra claims—in particular, for lease or sale of 20 triremes, and support for 53 triremes that had not been part of the original Athenian contingent at Artemision, but had performed other duties and then gone there. Of course, Themistokles may simply have taken, or have been said to take, more than he was entitled to take.

Or does the story depend on malicious juggling of currency standards? If the daily allowance for the nine days was in fact *two Euboio-Attic* obols for everyone, then correct totals for the commanders based on the number of triremes are given by the proportion 40:"66⅔":"165"::4:6⅔:16½. From a Peloponnesian point of view such payments would be smaller than they sounded, for Euboio-Attic money was worth no more than ¾ of their own: "2 obols" was no better than 1½ obols, nor "4 T" than 3 T nor "6⅔" T than 5 T. On the other hand, if someone mistook or misrepresented Themistokles' 16½ T as Aiginetic then it was at least the equivalent of 4/3 × 16½ = 22 Euboio-Attic T.

This suggestion obviously raises the problem of multi-national currency conversion calculations in 480, which is a somewhat daunting one whether seen through the eyes of the *probouloi* making agreements at the Isthmus or those of sailors buying food at Artemision or those of Herodotos' informants polishing their stories years later or those of modern numismatists estimating intended silver content and thus bullion value. The following sketch may support the suggestion of a 3:4 ratio between Euboio-Attic and Aiginetic coin for our purposes. If Corinthian staters (tridrachms) were intended to pass as Euboio-Attic didrachms, and Corinthian drachms were intended to pass as Aiginetic hemi-drachms, then an Aiginetic didrachm was thought equivalent to four Corinthian drachms or four thirds of a Euboio-Attic didrachm. The usual estimate of silver content is more favourable again to the Aiginetic standard, suggesting a ratio of about 100:70 rather than 100:75. However, the sailor at Artemision would presumably find the commercial value of Euboio-Attic coin in comparison with Aiginetic somewhat higher than its theoretical comparative value. Moreover, public reports of Hellenic League finance will have tended to simply fractional computations. Was the first assessment of the Delian League perhaps similarly 350 Aiginetic T (=200 ships × 200 men × 1/4 dr. × 30 days × 7 months), expressed by Thucydides in Euboio-Attic terms as 4/3 × 350 = 466 2/3 T, rounded off to 460 T?

One last guess might help put all this in a general Hellenic League context. At Artemision Eurybiades had ca 2/3 × 100 ships in a fleet of ca 2/3 × 400. At Plataia, the Athenians (and Euboians and Troezenians) had 10,000 men in an army perhaps meant to be 40,000 strong, the Peloponnesians (excluding Corinth and Tegea) 20,000, and Corinth 5,000. 40,000 hoplites, each with an attendant, make 80,000 men, as many as serve in 400 triremes, perhaps needing the same *trophe*. Did The Hellenes decide that their maximum effort at any point would be to deploy 80,000 men (costing 100 T a month at 1 1/2 obols a man a day), and that Sparta and her immediate allies would provide 1/2 any land and 1/4 any sea force, Athens and hers 1/4 any land and 1/2 any sea force, Corinth 1/8 each, and the other Greeks the last 1/8 each? If so, August 480 saw a 2/3 fleet + 1/3 army planned, with the Athenian group providing (almost) 5/8 the 2/3 fleet instead of 1/2 the 2/3 fleet and 1/4 the 1/3 army. The Thermopylai figures are incomplete, the Salamis figures affected by losses, Mykale was largely a bonus owed to previous success.

Endnote B: Herodotos' Knowledge of Euboia:

Herodotos' sources of information about Euboia were clearly various, and there is no likelihood of discovering them all. A certain one is the victory monument at Athens for the defeat of Chalkis in the Triple Attack (5.77, cf. note 37), and doubtless much of the information about the 490 and 480 campaigns comes also from Athens (so F. Jacoby, "Herodotos," *RE* Supp. 2, coll. 443, 458, cf. 439); plausible candidates are: the withdrawal of the Athenian klerouchs from Eretria in 6.100.2, the libel on Adeimantos at Artemision in 8.4–5, the oracle of Bakis in 8.20, cf. notes 31, 21, 27. The story of the forwarding of the Hyperborean offerings via Karystos on their way to Delos came from the Delians (4.33.1–2).

Did Herodotos have also Euboian informants? That he never mentions any is no bar to thinking so, for he does not cite his sources except for surprising or obscure or controversial items: thus "the Corinthians" only in 1.23 to support a Lesbian and in 8.94 to oppose an Athenian story, though the Corinthians he talked to will hardly have confined themselves to these precise topics (one would expect some of the stories about the tyranny to be local, esp. in 5.92), and "the Thebans" only in 8.135 (Mys the Carian), though the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes was familiar (5.59–61, cf. 1.52, 92, 8.134). On the general question, and especially as regards named individual sources: J. R. Grant (above, note 4).

However, Herodotos shows no special knowledge concerning either the states of Histiaia and Chalkis or their actions (for Chalkis, see note 37). There remains some reason to suppose that he had particular information about Eretria and Eretrians, and he may have visited the Karystia.

In his account of the Ionian Revolt, Herodotos says that the Athenians took five Eretrian ships with them in 498. These shared in the expedition not for the sake of the Athenians, but for that of the Milesians themselves, in repayment of a debt (5.99.1). This report of Eretrian motives sounds Eretrian—who else would deny specifically that the Eretrians were merely doing Athens a favour (as some self-possessed Athenian or disgruntled Ionian may have alleged), only to substitute as the real reason an obvious piece of official Eretrian legend? (Plutarch's complaints about anti-Eretrian bias are met in note 30.) Herodotos' knowledge of Eretrian detail is also impressive. In the 490 campaign he lists the names of three places in Eretrian territory where Persians landed—the names are probably correct, and so obscure that they have often even been emended out of Herodotos' text (W. P. Wallace, "The Demes of Eretria," *Hesperia* 16 [1947] 115–146 at 130–133). He has the names of one prominent loyalist and two traitors (6.100–101). And he includes a vivid account of the place near Susa where Dareios afterward settled the Eretrian prisoners; if he did not in fact visit it himself he had at least a source particularly interested in the new community.

As for the Karystians, Herodotos gives their motive for resistance in 490 in their own terms (emotionally rather than factually expressed, see also note 34, and with no such critical addendum as in the case of the Phokians, 8.30). Later he gives a very precise report of the death of Hermolykos, who won the prize of valour at Mykale: "This Hermolykos it afterwards befell, war existing between Athenians and Karystians, to die at Kyrnos in the Karystia in battle, and lie at Geraistos." Kyrnos is not otherwise known. Geraistos was Karystos' international port, and of more consequence than has always been remarked; few ships will have taken the long detour into the great bay of Karystos and out again. For the sanctuary of Poseidon, Pindar *Ol.* 13.159, Ar. *Eq.* 561, Kallimachos 4.199 and schol., and esp. *Hesperia* 37 (1968) 184–199; for shipping, Thuc. 3.3.5, Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4. with Plut. *Ages.* 6, Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61, Dem. 4.34, Dem. 19.326, Arrian *Anab.* 2.1.2, Livy 31.45, Prokopios *Goth.* 4.22.27. There may well have been Athenian settlement there, at least from 450–411, and perhaps from "Hermolykos' war" to after 375 (M. B. Wallace, above note 34, ch. 3, *Phoenix* 27 [1973] 311). Herodotos is likely enough to have stopped there at some time, and one of the few sights will have been Hermolykos' tomb. Certainly Herodotos' inclusion both of the hopelessly obscure place where Hermolykos died and of the town where he found burial is more probably due to local informants than any others (for Hermolykos' family see *Hesperia* 37 [1968] 117–120).

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, TORONTO